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RECENT CASES

A SEPARATE SALES TAX UPON VENDORS
In Walgreen Company v. State Board of Equalization, (Wyo. 1946) 166

P. (2d) 960,1 a declaratory judgment action, the appellant company challenged
the validity of an assessment levied against it under the Wyoming Selective Sales
Tax Act of 1937. Various contentions of the Walgreen Company were focused
upon the construction of those portions of the tax statute which impose a two per
cent tax upon sales of twenty-five cents or more (to be paid by consumers), and
a one per cent tax upon sales of twenty-four cents or less, to be "assumed and
paid for by the vendor who shall keep a detailed segregated record of all such
sales."2 This statute enables sellers to elect to pay a tax of one per cent (rather
than two per cent) on purchases of twenty-four cents or less, by maintaining a
segregated record of such purchases. A further statutory provision required
submission to the Board of Equalization of collections in excess of two per
cent of "total taxable sales." 3 The appellant urged that this latter provision
referred to all taxable purchases (made at any price), and that the maximum possible liability of vendors, when so interpreted, could equal only two
per cent of the purchase price of such total sales. This premise supported a final
and specific contention that an amount of $1,423.26, legally collected as excess

under the two per cent tax upon vendees, could properly be applied in satisfaction
of the one per cent tax upon sales of twenty-four cents or less.A The Board of
Equalization maintained that two distinct taxes were imposed by the statute.
One tax was described as a burden upon consumers for two per cent of the
purchase price of sales of twenty-five cents or more. The other tax of one per
cent upon sales of twenty-four cents or less was said to be the primary responsibility of vendors. Held, that the judgment of the District Court for the State
Board of Equalization should be affirmed. Blume, C. J., dissented. The majority of the court concluded that the statute evidenced a positive legislative intent
to fix upon vendors a separate tax burden equivalent to one per cent of the purchase price of sales of twenty-four cents or less. It followed that sellers could not
utilize excess monies collected by them, under the tax upon vendees, to satisfy
their own indebtedness arising from the one per cent tax. The contention of the
appellant that no excess sum was due the state since no amount had been collected in excess of two per cent of all sales (both of twenty-five cents and over,
and twenty-four cents and under), was held not to be sound.
The majority of the court was convinced that the true intent of the legislature to fasten a distinct tax upon merchants is manifest in the words of the
1. Petition for rehearing denied: (Wyo. 1946) 169 P. (2d) 76.
2. Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, Vol. 2, Sec. 32-2504, (e); (Selective Sales Tax
Act of 1937, S. L. Wyo., 1947, Ch. 102, Sec. 4 (e)).
3. Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, Vol. 2, Sec. 32-2505; (Selective Sales Tax Act of
1937, S. L. Wyo., 1937, Ch. 102. Sec. 5): "If any vendor shall . . . collect as a tax an
amount in excess of 2% of his total taxable sales, he shall remit to the Board the full
amount of the tax herein imposed, and also such excess;".
4. The Walgreen Company had not collected any sum in excess of two per cent of

all of their sales, both over and under twenty-five cents. In dissent, Blume, C. J.,
stressed the fact that, under he Wyoming Sales Tax Act, it is arithmetically possible to coilect an amount legally in excess of the two per cent tax on purchases of
twenty-five cents and more.
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law. Considerable importance, however, was attached to legislative acquiescence
in an interpretation of the statute in question, prepared (but never widely published) by the Attorney General eight days after 'its effective date, and followed
by the Board of Equalization since that time. s (This interpretation was in harmony with the contentions of the Attorney General in the instant case.-) The
prevailing opinion justified its reliance upon such construction through evaluation of the well settled view that administrative interpretations, when properly
performed, are entitled to weights unless the construction so arrived at is clearly
7
erroneous.
A sifting of the problems contained in the instant case reveals the paramount importance of determining the legitimacy of the separate tax which is
fastened directly upon vendors. Thorough, though not exhaustive, research indicates that, because of the novel character of the Wyoming sales tax, this central question must be answered largely upon academic grounds. Analysis of the
varied methods of collection, utilized by states which tax the sale of goods, illustrates a fundamental lack of uniformity in administrative technique. a Apparently, however, the Wyoming sales tax, which combines a separate burden upon
merchants with a prerogative under which they may elect to reduce the amount
of such direct tax responsibility by keeping a segregated record of a portion of
their sales, is unusual when compared with more common methods of administration. History of sales taxation indicates a tendency, on the part of law
makers, to make the shifting of the tax to consumers mandatory. 9 Insight to the
significance of the Wyoming tax may be gained through analysis of systems currently existent in other states which are, in some respects, similar.lo
5. On April 8, 1937, Attorney General Lee rendered an interpretation of the statute here
in question: "The statute imposes two taxes. . . . The first tax is imposed upon the
purchaser. The second tax is imposed upon the vendors or sellers. . . . The vendor
has no right to take money paid to him by vendees in satisfaction of taxes which they
are required to pay, and apply the same to the payment of the tax which he is
required to pay".
6. See Baldwin v'. Roby, (1939) 54 Wyo. 439, 458; 93 P. (2d) 940, 947; Equitable Life
Assur. Society of U. S. v. Thulemeyer, (1935) 49 Wyo. 63, 94; 52 P. (2d) 1223, 1233.
7. See Christensen v. Sikora, (1941) 57 Wyo. 57, 74, 75; 112 P. (2d) 557, 563; Hodgell
v. Wilde, (1937) 52 Wyo. 310, 320; 74 P. (2d) 336, 340. For a pertinent discussion
of legislative acquiescence and the place of clearly erroneous interpretations, see,
Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, Randolph E. Paul,
(1940) 49 Yale L. J.. 660-685.
8. An annotation entitled Validity of so-called "Sales Tax", 110 A.L.R. 1485, 1486,
states: ". . . there is a lack of harmony as to the exact nature of the so-called 'sales
tax', various courts describing it as a license tax, a privilege tax, an occupation tax,
an income tax. and an excise tax". For a thorough discussion of the historical development of the sales tax in the several states, see, Haig and Shoup, The Sales Tax
in the American States, (1934) Chapters 5. 6. 7, and 8. Problems involved in the
administration of a sales tax system are enumerated by Rousee and Hester in The
Sales Tax, (1938) P. 160.
9. Alfred B. Buehler, An Appraisal of General Sales Tax Experiences in the United
States, Tax Policy, 3:2, March 1936: "An interesting development in American general taxation has been the provision in many state laws that the tax must not be
absorbed by dealers but must be shifted to consumers." An Act to Raise Revenue,
Public Laws of North Carolina, 1939, Ch. 158, Art. V, Schedule E, Sec. 401, makes
a public offer, on the part of a merchant, to absorb the state sales tax, a misdemeanor.
The Emergency Retail Sales Tax Act, S. L. Colo., 1935, Ch. 189, Sec. 5(d), provides
for a similar restriction.
10. In a letter dated December 23, 1946, Benjamin D. Mintener, Assistant Attorney
General of South Dakota, states: "The Supreme Court of our state held that the
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Blume, C. J., reached conclusions which clash sharply with the tenor of
the majority opinion. The dissent conducted an historical appraisal of the tax
statute and concluded that the legislature intended to fashion a more adequate
scale for assessing an average tax, and not to subject vendors to a separate tax
burden. An attack was also made, in the dissenting opinion, upon the constitutionality of the tax on sellers."
The concept of a dual sales tax is described by the majority opinion as
"unique", and by the dissent, as a "maverick". This point of superficial accord
embraces an element which is meaningful to evolution of taxation policies. One
might well inquire whether Wyoming has not taken a step toward making the
term "sales tax" more truly descriptive of the burden actually imposed since the
tax is conventionally construed as being. levied purely upon the privilege of acquiring (not selling) property.
Concrete judicial sanction of a tax which is legally directed at vendors will
stir the interest of professional students of the subject who have, for economic
reasons, expressed doubt as to the ability of merchants to shift a sales tax to
consumers.' 2
South Dakota sales tax was a tax upon the retailer rather than upon the consumer."
State ex rel, Sioux Falls Motor Co. v. Welch, (1936) 65 S. D. 68; 270 N. W. 852.
In a letter dated December 16, 1946, Irving H. Perluss, Deputy Attorney General of California, states: "Section 6051 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides
that the tax is imposed upon retailers for the privilege of selling tangible personal
property at retail".
In a letter dated December 13, 1946, George F. Barrett, Attorney General of
Illinois, states: ". . . the State of Illinois does have a revenue measure imposing an
occupation tax on all persons engaged in the sale of tangible personal property at
retail, said tax being computed on a basis of a percentage of the gross receipts
from such sales. This is a tax against the retailer and is not a tax on the purchaser.
. . . the constitutionality of this statute was considered and upheld by the Illinois
Supreme Court in the case of Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E. 889."
The Mississippi Sales Tax Law of 1934, as amended, Sec. 2: "There is hereby
levied and shall be collected annual privilege taxes, measured by the amount or
volume of business done, against the persons, on account of the business activities,
and in the amounts to be determined by the application of rates against values, or
".
gross income, or gross proceeds of sales, as the case may be ..
An Act to Raise Revenue, Public Laws of North Carolina, 1939, ch. 158, Article
5, Schedule E, Sec. 401. describes the state tax upon the sale of tangible personal
property as a "license or privilege tax for engaging or continuing in the business
of a 'wholesale' or 'retail' merchant . . .". The same section, however, expresses
an intention that the tax levied shall be passed on to consumers.
Excise Taxes in their Relation to Property Taxes, Arthur S. Dayton, (1939)
46 W. Va. L. Q., 21-46. In discussing taxes upon the transferor of property and
taxes upon those who acquire property, Mr. Dayton says: "It is conceivably possible that they might be extended and merged so that every sale of property would
be subject to two kinds of tax-(1) upon the seller-, and (2) upon the purchaser".
11. Blume, C. J., maintained that an independent tax upon vendors lacks uniformity
and is discriminatory in that merchants selling goods for less than twenty-five cents
are prohibited from collecting the tax on such sales from consumers. In State v.
Holly Sugar Co., (1941) 57 Wyo. 272, 285, 116 P. (2d) 847, 851, the court construed the 1937 tax statute as being, in many respects, amendatory of the 1935 Sales
Tax Act.
12. Carl Shoup, The Sales Tax, Annals of the American Academy, 183:104, Jan., 1936:
"A survey of some thirty thousand retailers made in the summer of 1933 in three
sales-taxing states indicated that during the first few months of the tax, particularly under a rate of 2 per cent or less, many merchants were finding it advisable
to absorb part or all of the burden out of their profits or capital rather than attempt
to pass it on to consumers."
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Criticism of the sales tax has long clustered about a charge that it is regressive in that it places an inordinate burden upon the poor. The extent to which
a so called "separate" tax will be passed on to consumers is not to be easily determined.' 3 It is conceivable, however, that an assumption by vendors of a portion of the sales tax burden could assist in rebutting the argument that the tax
works a hardship upon vendees who are possessed of limited assets.
There seems to be no doubt that the sales tax will, because of its revenue
gathering attributes, insure its own .survival.' 4 A realistic acceptance of the
presence and permanence of the tax leaves small ground for condemnation of
the innovation which Wyoming has placed upon it. The collection mechanisms
in force throughout the nation are too broadly divergent in type and method to
justifiably censor any one technique as a departure from some hypothetical norm.
Judgment as to the attributes and evils of particular systems and features thereof
must be founded upon sound principles of public welfare, fiscal need, and constitutional conformity.15
ELMER K. NELSON, JR.
13. Dayton D. McKean, Soaking the Poor, New Republic, 84:121, Sept. 11, 1935:
tax of 1 per cent is often absorbed by the seller".
14. Robert C. Brown, Some Legal Aspects of State Sales and Use Taxes, (1943)
Ind. L. J., P. 78: "The enormous productivity of the sales tax, even in periods
comparative financial stress, is likely to insure, not merely its maintenance, but
continual extension."
15. In Walgreen Company v. State Board of Equalization, Civil Number 3045, an
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tion pending before the District Court of the United States for the District of

Wyoming, an injunction is presently being sought, on grounds of constitutionality,
against the payment of the tax attacked in the instant case.

OIL AND GAS ROYALTY SYNONYMOUS WITH MINERAL INTEREST

In an action for an accounting the parties were in sharp conflict as to the
meaning of the term "royalty" as used in an oral contract and in letters pertaining to the contract. Hudson owned a one-half interest in and under three separate tracts of land, which he conveyed to the Mabee Oil and Gas Co. reserving
to himself a one-fourth interest in the profits in excess of $6,000.00. In letters
relating to the oral contract, Hudson always referred to his interest as the "mineral interest", while Mabee referred to Hudson's interest as the "royalty" in-

terest. The dispute arose when Hudson contended that he was to receive his
share from all the profits derived from the "mineral interest" even after the
expiration of the existing leases, whereas Mabee contended that Hudson was
to receive his share from the existing leases only. The first drilling had resulted
in dry holes and after the expiration of the leases the Mabee Co. developed the
property and realized substantial production. In determining the case the trial
court held that the term "royalty" as used in the contract was synonymous with
the term "mineral interest" and that Hudson's "royalty" was a real property
interest. This decision was upheld by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as
being the meaning attached to the term "royalty" in the Oklahoma oil fraternity.
Hudson v. Mabee Oil & Gas Co., (1946) 156 F. (2d) 450.

